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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff Barry Searcy, an inmate in the custody of the Idaho Department

of Correction ("IDOC"), initiated the instant action by filing a Civil Complaint against the IDOC,
the Board of Correction ("BOC") and various employees of the IDOC. Plaintiffs Complaint
generally alleges that Defendants violated the constitution and laws of Idaho by charging inmates
telephone sales commissions, commissary sales commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopying
fees and hobby craft surcharges. 2 Plaintiff argued that absent legislation specifically and explicitly
authorizing the collection of such fees, the IDOC may not impose them and that Defendants
imposition of the subject fees invaded the province ofthe Legislature, which has the exclusive power
to raise revenue, make lavv' and provide support for the State's penal institutions. The instant appeal
is brought in connection with the Orders of the District Court denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R, pp. 000511-530;
R, pp. 000726-737.)

To promote clatity and simplicity pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(d), this brief shall
refer to the parties by the designations used in the trial court rather than "appellant" and
"respondent."
1

2Plaintiff's

claims related to the hobby craft surcharge are not part of the subject matter of

this appeal.
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The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether the charging of user fees related to commissary
purchases, telephone use, medical services and photocopy services invades the province of
Legislature. Quite simply, the answer is no. The Board of Correction is the body that has been
expressly granted the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries ofldaho, and Idaho's
statutory scheme governing the State Board of Correction, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, contains
a broad grant of authority to the Board of Correction to carry out its duties, which inherently
encompasses the power to establish institutional programs and services for inmates and to develop
methods for implementing the same. Ultimately, Plaintiffs complaint sterns from his voluntary
decisions on how to spend his money; in exchange for his money, Plaintiff has received goods and
the value of services rendered. Requiring Plaintiff to bear personal expenses that he is able to meet,
and would be required to meet in the outside world, is both legal and appropriate. For these reasons
and those set forth more fully herein, the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants should be affirmed.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
Defendants agree with the course of proceedings set forth in Appellant's Brief.

C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the Idaho Department

of Correction. (R, p. 000025 at if7.) The IDOC is the state government agency responsible for the
incarceration and community supervision of felony offenders in Idaho. (R, p. 000313 at 'fl3; R, p.
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000571 at ;r3.) The IDOC is an executive department of state government. LC. §20-201. A threemember panel called the Board of Correction oversees the IDOC. LC. §§20-201, 20-201A. (R, p.
000313 at ,I3; R, p. 000571 at ;r3.) The Board of Correction appoints a Director to serve as the head
of the agency. LC. §§20-217A. (R, p. 000313 at i14; R, p. 000571 at i14.) The Director provides
leadership, selects administrators and sets the strategic direction of the agency. LC. §§20-217 A. (R,
p. 000571 at ,r4.)
The IDOC manages and administers rules under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act
("IDAP A"). (R, p. 000573 at ;rs.) A unique rule making process applies to the Idaho Department of
Corrections as set forth in Idaho Code §20-212. (Id.) Pursuant to Idaho Code §20-212(1), the rules
of the Board, as defined therein, are subject to review of the legislature pursuant to sections 67-454,
67-5291 and 67-5292, Idaho Code, but no other provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, apply to the Board, except as otherwise specifically provided
by statute. (Id.) Thus, the Idaho Board of Correction is exempt from holding negotiated rule making
meetings and public hearings. (Id.)
The "Rules of the Board of Correction," which are promulgated pursuant to the unique
rulemaking process set forth in Idaho Code §20-212, are found in IDAP A 06, Title O1, Chapter O1.
(R, p. 000573 at ,I8.) Idaho Board of Correction IDAP A rules have the full force and effect oflaw
and interpret, order and/or implement Idaho laws or IDOC policies, standard operating procedures
or directives that affect the rights of the general public. (R, p. 000573 at ,rs; R, p. 000634.) BOC
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IDAP A rules need not include statements concerning only the internal management of the
Department that do not affect the rights of, or procedures available to, the general public. (R, p.
000573 at ,is; R, pp. 000634-635.) See also Idaho Code §20-212(2).

In addition to IDAP A rules, the IDOC manages and administers over 400 internal policies
and procedures. (R, p. 000572 at 17.) IDOC policies serve as the official communication ofIDOC
management philosophy regarding IDOC operations, practices and individuals under the authority
of the Director of the IDOC and the Idaho Board of Correction. (R, p. 000572 at i!7; R, p. 000581.)
standard operating procedures ("SOPs") provide instruction and/or step-by-step procedure for
implementing an IDOC policy. (R, p. 000572 at i!7; R, p. 000609.) Unlike BOC IDAP A rules, IDOC
policies and SOPs do not have the force and effect oflaw, though they do provide an !DOC-required
course of action to follow. (R, p. 000572 at ,I7; R, p. 000581.)
The operating budgets of individual state ofldaho agencies, including the Idaho Department
of Correction, are established annually. (R, p. 000566 at i[6.) Appropriation acts establishing annual
agency operating budgets are law, and the limits of those budgets cannot be exceeded. Id. The IDOC
is funded primarily from the State General Fund. (R, p. 000316 at ,12; R, p. 000566 at ,I7.) Other
funding sources include, but are not necessarily limited to, endowment income, cost of supervision
fees, inmate labor, federal grants, and miscellaneous revenue. (Id.)
The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, which makes up part of the annual budget appropriated
by the Legislature for the operation of the state correction system, includes money from the inmate
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management fund ("IMF"). (R, p. 000316 at 114.) The IMF is made up of money that is collected
by the IDOC and deposited in the state treasury. (Id.) The source of these monies includes, but is not
limited to: telephone revenue; commissary revenue; vending revenue; laundry revenue; donation
revenue; and social security revenue. (R, p. 000316 at ifl 4; R, p. 000361.) IMF money is deposited
in the state treasury and is appropriated to the IDOC as part of its annual budget from the Idaho
Legislature. (R, p. 000316 at iP 5.) There is no state law governing what expenditures can be made
with IMF monies, and it is within the discretion of each IDOC facility how to spend its portion of
the IMF. (Id.)
As set forth in IDOC Policy 406 (Commissary Privileges and Services), the IDOC makes
commissary services available to the incarcerated population. (R, p. 000317 at iP 7; R, pp. 000386388.) Commissary services provide inmates with the opportunity to purchase items that are not
necessary for prison existence but approved for use by the IDOC. (R, p. 000317 at ifl 7; R, p.
000388.) The Inmate Management Fund is partially comprised of funds from commissary revenue,
which is the contractual sales percentage commission agreed upon by the IDOC and the commissary
vendor. (R, p. 000362.) The revenue is calculated by taking gross commissary saies and subtracting
the agreed upon percentage. (Id.)
As set forth in IDOC Policy 503 (Use of Telephones by Offenders), it is the policy of the
Board of Corrections to allow the use of telephones to inmates based on security needs and
resources. (R, p. 000317 at ill 8; R, p. 0003 91.) The Inmate Management Fund is partially comprised
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of funds from telephone revenue, which is the commission amount agreed upon by the IDOC and
the telephone vendor. (R, p. 000361,)
In addition to money from the inmate management fund, the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund
is also comprised of money from photocopying fees and medical co-pay fees. (R, p. 000317 at 'iil 6;
R, p. 000566 at 4J8.) As set forth in IDOC SOP 405.02.01.001 (Access to Courts), offenders have
copying privileges subject to the following conditions: offenders (excluding indigent offenders) will
be charged a fee of ten cents ($.10) per page for copies and page limitations on pleadings may be
enforced in accordance with court rules. (R, p. 000317 at ,r16; R, p. 000373.) Fees charged for
photocopying are deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund. (R, p. 000317 at ,r16.)
Additionally, the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund is comprised of money from medical co-pay fees.
(R, p. 000566 at ,rs.) As set forth in IDOC Policy 411 (Medical Co-pay), the Idaho Department of
Correction and its contractors charge offenders incarcerated at IDOC facilities a co-pay for medical
and pharmacy services, but do not deny access to medical, dental and mental health services when
the offender does not have the resources to pay for such services. (R, p. 000318 at,rl 9; R, p. 000394;
R, p. 000566 at ,I9.) Generally, an offender-initiated visit for sick cali service is assessed a medicai
co-pay of five dollars ($5.00). (R, p. 000399; R, p. 000566 at ,r9.) A pharmacy service medical copay fee of three dollars ($3 .00) per course/treatment or per prescription will be assessed to each
offender patient who is dispensed over-the-counter or prescription medications. (R, p. 000400; R,
p. 000566 at 4J9.) The money from photocopying and medical co-pay fees is deposited in the
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Miscellaneous Revenue Fund in the state treasury before it is ultimately appropriated back to the
IDOC each year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature. (R, p. 000317 at ill 6; R, p.
000567 at i!lO.) Medical co-pay funds deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund are used to
offset General Fund medical expenses. (R, p. 000318 at ;p 9; R. p. 000399; R, p. 000567 at ill i .)
For Fiscal Year 2012, for example, the Legislature appropriated $81,000 collected from inmates
through medical co-payments for this purpose. (R, p. 000567 at i'11.)

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
Defendants contend that the primary issues presented to this Court are:

B.

1.

Whether the District Court Correctly Determined That Defendants Did Not Invade
the Province of the Legislature.

2.

Whether the District Court Correctly Granted Summmy Judgment for the
Defendants.

COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5), 40, and 41, Defendants contend that they are

entitled to an award of their costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. These contentions are
supported by Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 31-3220A(16). See Argument, i,ifra, at Section V, subparagraph D.
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V. ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD

REVIK\V.

Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Rule
56(c) provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter oflaw.

"[T]he purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of trial where facts
are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of law which is
certain." Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896, 899 (1984).
"When reviewing an order for summar; judgment, the standard of review for this Court is
the same stai1dard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion."Interrnountain Real
Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313,311 P.3d 734, 737 (2013). The Court will liberally
construe all controverted facts in favor of the non-moving party and will draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company ofIdaho, 145 Idaho 459,
461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, there is only a question
oflaw over which the Court will exercise free review. Jnfanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47,
44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002). "The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and [the] Court must evaluate each
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party's motion on its own merits." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho
31 P.3d

I

'

(2001J.

This Court can affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternate grounds when a judgment
on appeal reaches the correct conclusion but emolovs reasonirnr contrarv to that of this Court
....

....

..l.

..,

'-7

.,,

Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. RexM &Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,218, 177 P.3d 955,
965 (2008) (citation omitted). Moreover, "it is well established that this Court will use the correct
legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a district court even when it is based on an erroneous
legal theory." JR. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849,853,820 P.2d 1206,
1210 (I 991) (citation omitted).

B.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.
The matters before this Court involve the interpretation of Idaho's statutory scheme

governing the State Board of Correction, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code. This Court exercises free
review over matters of statuto1yinterpretation. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,327,208 P.3d 730, 731
(2009). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "derive the intent of the legislature." State v.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123,150 (2008). It is a well-established maxim of statutory
interpretation that the Court "must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine
the intent of the legislature." Ameritell Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Community

Center, 146 Idaho 202,204,192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008). This starts with the "literal words of the
statute," giving those words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning unless such meaning is contrary
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to clearly expressed legislative intent or would lead to absurd results. Doe, 147 at 328, 208 P .3d at
The Court should "'not deal m any subtle refinements of the leg1slat10n, but ... ascertam and
give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word
therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions." Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 150.
"When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the courts should
give weight to it as evidence." State v. Nab, 112 Idaho 1139, 1141, 739 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App.
1987) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§
47.15 at 157 (4th ed. 1984)). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court "has long followed the rule that
the construction given to a statute by the executive and administrative officers of the State is entitled
to great weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons fur holding
otherwise." JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 854, 820 P.2d at 1211.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERL'\r1Ii~ED THAT DEFENDANTS DID
NOT INVADE THE PROVINCE OF THE LEGISLATURE.

The Board of Correction is the body that has been expressly granted the control, direction and
management of the penitentiaries of Idaho. State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347,348,563 P.2d 405,406
(1977). Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 5, mandated that the Idaho Legislature create a Board
of Correction:
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the state
board of correction ... This board shall have the control, direction and management
of the penitentiaries of the state, their employees and properties, and of adult
probation and parole, with such compensation, powers, and duties as may be
prescribed by law.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 10

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code,
which created the Board of Correction to control, direct and manage the Idaho's correctional
facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its custody. See LC. §§2020 IA, 20-209(1 ). "The Board, with its constitutionally anchored control over prisons, paroles and
probations, is recognized as an agency of the executive branch." lvlellinger v. !DOC, 114 Idaho 494,
499,

P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App. 1988). See also I.C. §20-201 (stating the department of

correction shall be an executive department of state government). The Board's prescribed powers
include, but are not limited to, the power to make all necessary rules to carry out its duties, LC. §20212; the power to appoint a director of correction as the chief administrative officer for the Board
and business manager who shall assume all the authority, powers, functions and duties as may be
delegated to him by the board, LC. §20-217A; and the power to make and adopt such rules and
regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional facility as they may consider
expedient, LC. §20-244.
Thus, it is the executive branch, not the legislative or judicial branches, that is responsible
for the control, direction and management of Idaho's correctional facilities. See Burge v. State, 90
Idaho 473,476,413 P.2d 451, 452-53 (1966) ("[T]he supervision and maintenance of prisons is a
function of the executive branch of the government, and ... in the State ofldaho the State Board
of Corrections is the body which has been expressly granted the control, Idaho Constitution, Art. X,
Sec. 5; LC. s 20-209; and ... the courts do not have jurisdiction to supervise matters of ordinary
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prison discipline."). Accordingly, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, contains a broad grant of
uulhunty Lu lht: Bmml uf Currection including to make all necessary rules to carry out its duties and

to make and adopt such rules and regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional
facility as they may consider expedient. I.C. §20-212; I.C. §20-244.

"[T]he State Board of

Correction exercises its constitutional and statutory authority through the instrumentality of the
Department of Correction." Idaho Dept. ofCorrection v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 680, 690, 8 P 3d 675,
685 (Ct. App. 2000). Despite this broad grant of power, Plaintiff argues that the policies and
procedures put in place by the IDOC and which impose medical co-pay fees, photocopy fees,
telephone commissions and commissary sales commissions are a violation of the separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches of the state government pursuant to Idaho
Constitution, Article II, Section 1. Article II of the Idaho Constitution is titled Distribution ofPowers
and provides:
§ 1. Departments of government
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that the imposition of the subject fees violates the separation of powers
doctrine of the Idaho constitution because it intrudes upon the Legislature's power to raise revenue,
support the State's penal institutions, and make law. As set forth more fully below, the District Court
correctly determined that the fees at issue are not a violation of the separation of powers between the
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 12

executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article II,
Section L
1.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Fees at Issue Are Not
Unconstitutional Taxes.

Article VII3 of the Idaho Constitution is titled Finance and Revenue and provides in pertinent
part:

§ 2. Revenue to be provided by taxation
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by
valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter otherwise
provided. The legislature may also impose a license tax, both upon natural persons
and upon corporations, other than municipal, doing business in this state; also a per
capita tax: provided, the legislature may exempt a limited amount of improvements
upon land from taxation.

§ 16. Legislature to pass necessary laws
The legislature shall pass all laws necessary to carry out the provisions of this article.

Admittedly, the Board of Correction does not have the authority to levy taxes. However, the
fees at issue are not taxes. "[A] fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular
consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs." Potts

Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P .3d 8, 11 (2005)

While Plaintiff claims in his Appellant's Brief that he is not appealing the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of IDOC as to his Article VII, § §2 and 16, these issues are
necessarily subsumed within his argument that the IDOC violated the separation of powers between
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article
II, Section 1.
3
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(citation omitted). It cannot be disputed that the subject fees are assessed based upon an inmate's
individual consumption and use; an inmate will not be charged a telephone commission, a
commissary commission, a medical co-pay fee or a photocopy fee unless he utilizes telephone
services, purchases commissary items or seeks medical or photocopy services. In this regard, it
should be noted that an inmate will not be denied access to medical, dental and mental health
services if he does not have the resources to pay for such services nor are indigent inmates charged
photocopy fees. Thus, inmates such as Plaintiff, who have the ability to pay, make their own
decisions to make telephone calls, purchase commissary items, photocopy documents or obtain
medical services. In exchange for paying the subject fees, these inmates receive the value of services
rendered.
Moreover, taxes are primarily revenue raising measures. Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115
Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1989). It is apparent that the challenged fees do not constitute
impermissible taxes as they are not a forced contribution for revenue raising purposes. To the
contrary, the fees are voluntary and based upon individual consumption and use. The funds raised
incidentally to the provision of extra goods and services to inmates are ultimately appropriated back
to the IDOC for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316-318; R, p. 000566-567.) A fee does not become an
unconstitutional tax merely because it provides incidental revenue. See id; see also Foster's, Inc. v.
Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941) (stating: "The fact that the fees charged produce

more than the actual cost and expense of the enforcement and supervision is not an adequate
objection to the exaction of fees.").
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 14

The fees at issue are more properly characterized as "user fees." Unlike a tax, a user fee is
charge designed as compensation for the use of Government-supplied services, facilities or
benefits." US. v. US Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363, 118 S.Ct 1290, 1292 (1998). The District
Court correctly determined that each of the fees in question is a charge which is designed as
compensation for the use of government supplied services or benefits, such as medical care and
pharmacy services and photocopying supplies and services, and therefore, constitute user fees not
taxes. (R, p. 000736, LL. 6-12.) See also Vance v. Barret, 345 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding a fee charged for the creation and maintenance of inmate trust accounts was allowable as
a reasonable user fee imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of government services).

2.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Funds Necessary to Support
the State's Penal Institutions Need Not All Be Sourced From Revenue Provided
By Taxation.

Article X of the Idaho Constitution is titled Public Institutions and provides in pertinent part:
§ 1. State to establish and support institutions
Educational, reformatory, and penal institutions, and those for the benefit of the
insane, blind, deaf and dumb, and such other institutions as the public good may
require, shall be established and supported by the state in such manner as may be
prescribed by law.

"Section 1, article 10, is a direction to establish the institution, and authorizes state support, but does

not make such support exclusive nor prescribe how or from what sources the necessary funds shall
be obtained, but leaves that to the Legislature." State v. Johnson, 50 Idaho 363,368,296 P. 588, 58990 (I 931) ( emphasis added). In this regard, it is significant that the funds raised incidentally to the
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provision of services to inmates in the instant case are ultimately appropriated back to the IDOC by
the Legislature for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316-3 I 8~ R, p. 000566-567 .)
The operating budget of the Idaho Department of Correction is established annually. (R, p.
000566 at ,I6.) The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, which makes up part of the annual budget
appropriated by the Legislature for the operation of the state correction system, includes money from
the inmate management fund, which is comprised, in part, of money from telephone revenue and
commissary revenue, as well as money from medical co-pay and photocopy fees. (R, p. 000316 at

ill 4.) Both IMF money and monies from photocopying and medical co-pay fees are deposited in the
Miscellaneous Revenue Fund in the state treasury before ultimately being appropriated back to the
IDOC each year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature. (R, p. 00316-318; R, p.
000566-567.) Thus, the Legislature eventually appropriates monies from the subject fees to the
IDOC. (Id.) In light of the same, it cannot be said the collection of such fees is unauthorized.
The District Court correctly found that the funds necessary to support the penal institutions
of the State need not all be sourced from revenue provided by taxation. (R, p. 000735, LL 22-24.)
Pursuant to Article X, Section 1, "[t]he policy is that there shall be state institutions, the manner of
establishment and support thereof by the state to be as prescribed by the Legislature, and state
support may come from many sources." Johnson, 50 Idaho at 368, 296 P. at 589-90. Any monies
raised incidentally from the subject user fees are deposited in the state treasury; it is the Legislature
that appropriates these funds to the IDOC each year as part of its annual budget. (R, p. 000316-318;
R, p. 000566-567.) Thus, the IDOC is not invading the province of the Legislature, as it is the
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 16

Legislature that ultimately prescribes the support of the IDOC through the budget and appropriations
process.

3.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Defendants Did Not Exceed The
Scope of Their Authority.

The Board of Correction does not dispute that the power to make "law" lies exclusively
within the province of the legislature. See Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P2d 410,414
(1990). However, the policies and procedures that impose the fees at issue are not "laws" but
regulations relating to the internal management of the IDOC. "Such authority to make rules and
regulations to carry out an express legislative purpose or to effect the operation and enforcement of
the same is not exclusively a legislative power, but is administrative in its nature." State v. Heitz,
Idaho 107, 112,238 P.2d 439, 442 (1951).
The Board of Correction is the body that has been expressly granted the control, direction and
management of the penitentiaries ofldaho. Reese, 98 Idaho at 348, 563 P.2d at 406. "Idaho Code
20-212 and 20-244 empower the State Board of Correction to make and adopt rules and regulations
for the efficient management of prison administration and discipline." Waggoner v. State, 121 Idaho
758, 760 n. 3, 828 P.2d 321,323 (Ct. App. 1991). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff contends that because
there is no direct provision in Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, permitting the IDOC to collect
commissions or assess monetarJ charges for goods provided and services rendered to inmates it has
no authority to do so. Plaintiff essentially argues that the omission of a provision specifically
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allowing correctional facilities to charge user fees for goods and services provided to inmates evinces
a l,;;;gisbti vc; rnkut tu pwlubit lr1c; d1mgmg of :such foe:s.

However, the absence of express, specific provisions allowing the BOC to charge inmates
phone and commissary commissions, medical co-pay fees and photocopying fees does not mean it
lacks the authority to do so. To the contrary, the BOC has been granted broad authority to control,
direct, manage and govern Idaho's correctional facilities, which inherently encompasses the power
to establish institutional programs and services to inmates and impose user fees to offset costs. See
Idaho Const. Art. X, Sec. 5; LC. §20-201, et seq. Plaintiff has not identified any provision
prohibiting the challenged conduct nor has he offered any persuasive arguments why the power to
impose such fees cannot be naturally implied from the BOC's statutory authority. "It is a wellrecognized rnle of law that, if a board is charged with a specific duty and the means by which the
duty is to be accomplished are not specified or provided for, the board so charged has the implied
power to use such means as are reasonably necessary to the successful performance of the required
duty." Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311,321,341 P.2d 432,438 (1959) (citation omitted). Instructive
in this regard is the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court that the Idaho Transportation Department
CITD") had implied authority to issue a conditional permit despite the absence of express authority
to do so. Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442-43, 247 P.3d 666, 669-70 (2011). In that case, the
Court found that the power to determine when and how a developer may build an encroachment is
implied from the ITD's authority to regulate the design of public highways. Id. at 443, 247 P.3d at
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670. In reaching this determination the Court noted: "Since the Legislature cannot possibly foresee
all the practical difficulties that state agencies will encounter while carrying out their statutory
functions, 'administrative agencies have the implied or incidental powers that are reasonably
necessary in order to carry out the powers expressly granted."' Id at 442,247 P.3d at 669 (citing 2
Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §57 (2004)). See also Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232,
239,207 P.3d 963, 970 (2009) (holding that "the power to impose certain specific conditions upon
an application for an encroachment permit, including ... provision of bonds and construction of
traffic signals, is within the scope of the legislature's grant of authority to ITD to regulate the safe
use of and access to controlled access highways.").
Like the ITD, the Board of Correction has the inherent power to use such means as are
reasonably necessary to the successful performance of its duties. The Legislature could not possibly
foresee all the practical difficulties faat the BOC would encounter in controlling, directing, managing
and governing Idaho's correctional facilities, and so the Board was granted broad authority to carry
out its duties. Necessarily encompassed within the Board's authority is the ability to establish
institutional programs and services to inmates and to develop methods for implementing the same.
Otherwise, the Board would be unable to effectively govern the State's correctional facilities or care
for the inmates in its custody, preventing it from fulfilling its constitutional and statutory mandate.
The reasoning of the Court in Vickers is especially persuasive in the instant case when one
considers the incredibly difficult and complicated undertaking that the BOC has been tasked with
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in governing and managing Idaho's correctional facilities. It is well-established that the Court must
grant deference to the informed discret10n 0f 1,;u11cdw11al uffi1:1ab a::s '"pn::suu aJmmislraturs ... ,
and not the courts, (are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Turner

v. Safley, 482 US 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-61 (1987) (citation omitted). Accordingly, even if
a prison regulation impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, it will be valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. See id. The United States Supreme Court has explained
the rationale behind this standard: "Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id.
The great deference afforded prison administrators is illustrated by the numerous court
decisions that have upheld fees similar to the ones challenged in the instant case despite the fact that
the fees were not explicitly authorized by statute. For example, in Tillman v. Lebanon County

Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410,423 (3 rd Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit held that prison officials
could deduct monies from inmates' accounts to recover some of the costs of their imprisonment
despite the fact that there was no statutory authority for the same. In this regard, the Court stated:
"Although we have not uncovered a statute explicitly providing for the deductions at issue here, the
Cost Recovery Program was duly promulgated, not by the state, but by the county prison board,
which has 'exclusive[]' authority regarding 'the government and management of the facility."' Id.
(citation omitted). Likewise, in Olmos v. Ryan, No. CV 10-2564-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 4602517,
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at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2013) (not reported in F.Supp.2d)4, the United States District Court for
th.;; Di5trid uf A11Luua 1.;u11dw.h:J Llmt lhe Director of the Anzona Department of Correcnons
("ADC") did not need express statutory authority to charge inmates for postage, photocopies and
other items. Rather, the Court found that the "policies in question can be reasonably implied from
'a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole' because they relate to the operations of ADC
and administration of programs within the ADC." Id. at *6. See, e.g., Williamson v. Northampton
County Prison, No. 12-2333, 2012 WL 1656291, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (not reported in
F.Supp.2d) (finding the fact that a policy charging inmates for room and board is not grounded in
statute does not establish it is illegal and the complaint did not suggest that the program was not
properly authorized by the board of inspectors ofN orthampton County Correctional Facility or some
other appropriate authority); Barney v. Camden County Board ofChosen Freeholders, No. 08-4115,
2009 WL 5103206, at *7 (D. NJ. Dec. 17, 2009) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (holding the Board's
resolution charging prisoners a daily user fee did not constitute an ultra vires illegal act in the
absence of an express user fee statute because the Board had been expressly granted broad authority
to "prescribe the rules and regulation for the management and conduct [of county correctional
facilities]"); In re Hamilton, 41 Cal.App.4th 926,933, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

Defendants cite to unreported opinions in this section, not as binding precedent or authority,
but as examples of how other courts have dealt with issues similar to those presented to this Court
on appeal. See Staff ofthe Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,634, 22 P.3d
105, 109 (2001) (finding consideration of an unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as
an example, appropriate).
4
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(although none of the subject statutes specifically authorized a surcharge on handicraft materials,
such authority was manifest based on the broad discretionary power vested in the director of
Corrections and the legislature's intent that the handicraft program be self-supporting); Allah v.

Coughlin, 190 A.D.2d 233,237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding the imposition of a high school
equivalency examination fee falls within the broad grant of authority given to the Commissioner of
Correctional Services to operate the prison system, including fiscal management). This Court should
follow the lead of the numerous courts from various jurisdictions that have not "seen barriers to the
promulgation" of policies such as those complained ofby Plaintiff in the instant case. See Tillman,
221 F.3d at 423.
By statute and constitutional provision, the Idaho Board of Correction is vested with the
power to control, direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities, and the establishment of policies
that impose user fees for goods provided and services rendered in order to offset the costs of the
same is well within the ambit of its authority. The Board ultimately derives its power to control,
direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities from Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution.

See Mellinger, 114 Idaho at 499, 757 P.2d at 1218. Reflecting the constitutional mandate of Article
X, Section 5, Idaho Code §20-209 states in pertinent part:
The state board of correction shall have the control, direction and management of
such correctional facilities as may be acquired for use by the state board of correction
and all property owned or used in connection therewith, and shall provide for the
care, maintenance and employment of all prisoners now or hereinafter committed to
its custody.
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Idaho Code §20-209(1). In light of the clear grant of authority to the BOC to control and manage
Idaho's correctional facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its
custody, it cannot be said that Defendants infringed upon the province of the legislature in
developing procedures related to the provision of institutional programs, activities and services to
inmates, i.e. telephone services, commissary services, medical services and photocopy services.
Significantly, Plaintiff is not arguing that the Board of Correction does not have the authority to
provide inmates the opportunity to use the telephone, purchase commissary items, seek medical
treatment or photocopy documents. Thus, Plaintiff would seem to agree that, though there are no
direct statutory provisions permitting it to do so, the Board clearly has the authority and the
responsibility to provide institutional programs, activities and services to inmates. Plaintiff simply
disagrees with the Board's implementation of the same. However, the actions of the IDOC in this
regard clearly relate to the management and care ofldaho's correctional facilities and those in its
custody and are a proper exercise of the powers conferred by Article X, Section 5. In fact, as the
Idaho Constitution confers on the Board of Correction, not the Legislature, the management and
control of the state's penitentiaries, "the Legislature has not the power to take from that board the
management and control of that institution, or make any mles and regulations for the government
of the board that would in any way interfere with the efficient management and control of that
institution." Akley v. Perrin, 10 Idaho 531, 79 P. 192, 192 (1905).
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Thus, Idaho Code §20-212, which grants the authority to make "all necessary rules," as
defined in that section, to carry out the provisions of Chapter 2, Title 20, is not the sole source of the
Board of Correction's authority. Idaho Code §20-212 does not diminish or abridge the Board's broad
authority to manage and control Idaho's correctional facilities, which is a constitutionaily anchored
power, it merely brings the Board's rulemaking under legislative purview and protection. Prior to
its amendment in 1999, Idaho Code §20-212 did not provide any procedure for rulemaking nor did
it contain a definition of "rule."5 The legislative Statement of Purpose relating to amending Idaho
Code §20-212 to provide that the rules of the Board of Correction and the Department of Correction
be made in accordance with certain procedures, to define "rule," and to provide for legislative review
of the rules states in pertinent part:
[T]he Department of Correction is the only executive branch agency that is not
required to follow the Administrative Procedures Act (AP A) when adopting
procedural rules ... This bill would give the Department the same protection for
policy development and rule making that other state departments have by bringing
their rule making under legislative purview. In order to exclude inmate complaints
and other sensitive issues, this bill requires that procedural rules be brought before
the germane committees of the Legislature for review and approval, like other state
agencies, but exempts them from the other provisions of Chapter 52.

5The

prior version was titled "Rules and regulations - Authority of board," and provided:

The state board of correction shall make all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of this act not inconsistent with express statutes or the state constitution. They
shall fix the time and place of meetings, the order of business, the form of records to be kept,
the reports to be made, and all other regulations necessary to the efficient management and
control of the state penitentiary and all properties used in connection therewith.
Idaho Code §20-212 (1998).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 24

1999 Idaho Laws Ch. 311 (S.B. 1110). Thus, the legislative historj ofldaho Code §20-212 suggests
that it was amended to protect the Department of Correction in the exercise of its rulemaking
authority, not curtail it. Notably, in order for an agency "rule" to have the "force and effect oflaw,
it must be promuigated according to statutory directives for ruiemaking. Asarco Incorporated v.

State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143 (2003).
Pursuant to the plain language ofldaho Code §20-212, the procedures set forth therein are
only applicable with respect to the "rules" of the board, which are defined as follows:
(2) "Rule" as used in this section means the whole or a part of the board of correction
or department of correction's statement of general applicability
has been
promulgated in compliance with the provisions ofthis section and that implements,
interprets or prescribes:
(a) Law or policy; or
(b) The procedure or practice requirements of the board or department. The
term includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule, but
does not include:
(I) Statements concerning only the internal management or internal
personnel policies ofan agency and not affecting private rights ofthe public
or procedures available to the public; or
(ii) Declaratory rulings issued pursuant to statute or the board's rules; or
(iii) Intra-department memoranda; or
(iv) Any written statements given by the department or board which pertain
to an interpretation of a rule or to the documentation of compliance with a
rule.

Idaho Code §20-212(2) (emphasis added). This definition mirrors the definition of"rule" found in
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. LC. §67-5201 (19). Idaho Board of Correction IDAP A rules
have the fall force and effect of law and interpret, order and/or implement Idaho laws or IDOC
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policies, standard operating procedures or directives that affect the rights of the general public. (R,
p. 000573 at f18; R, p. 000634.) BOC IDAPA need not include statements concerning only the
internal management of the Department that do not affect the rights of, or procedures available to,
the general public. (Id.) See also Idaho Code §20-212(2). Those statements are set forth in IDOC
policies and procedures. (R, p. 000572 at f17; R, p. 000581; R, p. 000609.) Unlike BOC IDAPA
rules, IDOC policies and SOPs do not have the force and effect oflaw, though they do provide an
!DOC-required course of action to follow. (Id.)
Prior to Plaintiff initiating the instant litigation, the IDOC procedures imposing the fees at
issue in this case were not promulgated in accordance with the procedures set forth in Idaho Code
§20-212 because they concern only the internal management of the IDOC and do not affect the
private rights of or the procedures available to the public. Thus, they are not "rules" as defined in
Idaho Code §20-212(2) and not required to be promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking procedure
set forth therein. Compare with Service Employees International Union, Local 6 v. Frank, l 06 Idaho
756,759,683 P.2d 404,407 (1984) (finding Depai1ment's agency handbook "must be construed as
merely an internal guideline capable of being changed by an agency head, when necessary, not
having the force and effect oflaw, and thus not giving rise to a cause of action based on an alleged
violation.").
That the IDOC promulgated ID APA rules setting the IDOC fee structure, including the photo
copying and medical co-pay fees, during the pendency of this litigation does not reflect that these
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fees were necessarily subject to the rulemaking procedures ofldaho Code §20-212 and this cannot
be considered as proof of culpable conduct. See I.R.E. 407. Notably, the District Court did not decide
whether the fees at issue constituted a matter of law or policy or a matter concerning the internal
management of the IDOC. (R, p. 000734, LL. 17-20.) Because Piaintiffs ciaim was for deciaratory
judgment, the District Court instead found that the promulgation of IDAP A rules subject to
legislative oversight during the pendency of this matter constituted a remedial action that addressed
any possible concerns regarding the separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches of state government and mooted any claims under Idaho Code §20-212. (R, p. 000734-735,
LL. 21-24, 1-2.) \Vhile Defendants agree that this "remedial action" removes any possible
controversy and renders Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgment moot, they disagree with
Plaintiffs suggestion that he would be entitled to damages for the revenue raised prior to the IDAP A
rules going into effect. Such a notion presupposes that the IDOC procedures imposing the fees at
issue in this case were required to be promulgated pursuant to the procedure set forth in Idaho Code
§20-212, which Defendants dispute.
Significantly, Idaho Code §20-244, which empowers the Board to make and adopt rules and
regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional facility, does not indicate that such
"rules and regulations" are subject to legislative review or indicate that the procedure in Idaho Code
§20-212 is applicable. Notably, the definition of"rule" found in Idaho Code §20-212 only applies
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to the term as used in that section. LC. §20-212(2). Idaho Code §20-244, titled Government and

discipline of the correctional facility--Rules and regulations, states in its entirety:
The state board of correction shall make and adopt such rules and regulations for the
government and discipline of the correctional facility as they may consider expedient,
and from time to time, change and amend the same as circumstances may require. A
printed copy of the rules and regulations shall be furnished to every officer and guard
at the time he is appointed, and so much thereof as relates to the duties and
obligations of the convicted persons shall be given to the convicted person upon
reception at the state's correctional institutions.

Thus, the rules and regulations adopted under Idaho Code §20-244 are not conditioned upon
legislative review but rather can be adopted by the Board and changed and amended as
circumstances require. As such regulations are not required to be promulgated according to the
statutorJ directive for rulemaking they would not have the "force and effect of law" but would
provide an IDOC-required course of action to follow.
In support of his argument that the IDOC does not have the authority to charge user fees,
Plaintiff relies on Smith v. lwrida Department of Corrections, 920 So.2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005). In Smith the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that a fee charged for photocopying
services by the Department of Corrections to inmates was not supported by a specific grant of
legislative authority, which was required under Florida law, and was therefore invalid. Id. at 643.
In that case, the Court found that Florida's statutory scheme governing the DOC did not "authorize
the Department to make monetary assessments; it simply authorize[ d] the Department to collect
monetary assessments." Id. at 641-42 (emphasis in original). In concluding that the Department did
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not have the power to impose the copying fee, the Court noted that the Florida legislature had
enacted specific legislation authorizing the Department to collect medical copayments from inmates.

Id. at 642. The Court reasoned that this provision would have been unnecessary had the legislature
intended to grant the DOC unbridled discretion to charge an inmate for any services rendered. Id.
Plaintiffs reliance on Smith, which was based on Florida's statutory scheme governing the
Florida DOC, is inapposite in reviewing the scope of authority granted to the Idaho Board of
Corrections under Idaho law. Compare with Olmos, 2013 WL4602517, at *6 (finding the plaintiff's
reliance on Smith in challenging charges to inmates in the custody of the Arizona Department of
Corrections based on the absence of express statutory authority was misplaced because the Florida
court relied on the language of a Florida statute and Florida case law interpreting that statute, which
was not the law in A.rizona). By statute and constitutional provision, the Idaho Board of Correction
is vested with the power to control, direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities. See Idaho
Const. Art. X, Sec. 5; LC. §20-201A; LC. §20-209. Idaho Code §20-212 is not the sole source of the
Board of Correction's authority, as suggested by Plaintiff. "The Board ultimately derives its powers
from article 10, §5 of the Idaho Constitution." Mellinger, 114 Idaho at 499, 757 P.2d at 1218.
Moreover, unlike Florida's statute, Idaho's statutory scheme pertaining to the IDOC is void of
specific provisions that would have the effect oflimiting its authority to make monetary assessments
against inmates.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 29

The BOC has been granted broad authority to control, direct, manage and govern Idaho's
correctional facilities, which inherently encompasses the power to establish institutional programs
and services to inmates and to develop methods for implementing the same. Unlike in Smith, such
power is not curtailed by Idaho Code §20-225, which expressiy mentions monetary assessments, as
the fee authorized by that provision is entirely distinguishable from the fees at issue in the instant
case. The current version ofldaho Code §20-225 provides:
Any person under state probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute
not more than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month as determined by the board of
correction. Costs of supervision are the direct and indirect costs incurred by the
department of correction to supervise probationers and parolees, including tests to
determine drug and alcohol use, books and written materials to support rehabilitation
efforts, and monitoring of physical location through the use of technology. Any
failure to pay such contribution shall constitute grounds for the revocation of
probation by the court or the revocation of parole by the commission for pardons and
parole. The division of probation and parole in the department of correction may
exempt a person from the payment of all or any part of the foregoing contribution if
it finds any of the following factors to exist:
(1) The offender has diligently attempted but been unable to obtain employment.
(2) The offender has a disability affecting employment, as determined by a physical,
psychological or psychiatric examination acceptable to the division of probation and
parole.
Money collected as a fee for services will be placed in the probation and parole
receipts revenue fund, which is hereby created in the dedicated fund in the state
treasury, and utilized to provide supervision for clients. Moneys in the probation and
parole receipts revenue fund may be expended only after appropriation by the
legislature. This section shall not restrict the court from ordering the payment of
other costs and fees that, by law, may be imposed on persons who have been found
guilty of or have pled guilty to a criminal offense, including those who have been
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placed on probation or parole.
The plain language ofidaho Code §20-225 reveals a number offeatures that differentiate the
cost of supervision fee from the fees at issue in the instant case. First, it is significant that Idaho Code
§20-225 relates to collecting fees from parolees and probationers who are out in the community and
not residing in an IDOC correctional facility. Though the Board is charged with supervising parolees
and probationers under Idaho Code §20-219, its control over them is attenuated by virtue of their
status. Moreover, Idaho Code §20-225 makes payment for supervision mandatory: parolees and
probationers must pay for their cost of supervision unless they are exempt. Otherwise, it is doubtful
that parolees or probationers would voluntarily agree to contribute money for their supervision. In
contrast, the fees challenged by Plaintiff are charged to inmates residing at IDOC facilities based
upon their voluntary decisions on how to spend their money. If an inmate does not wish to pay the
telephone or commissary commission or medical co-pay or photocopy fees, he can choose not to
make phone calls, purchase commissary items, make photocopies, or obtain medical services. Idaho
Code §20-225 also provides consequences for a failure to pay the cost of supervision fee, i.e.
revocation of probation or parole. \Vithout Idaho Code §20-225 the BOC wouid have iittie recourse
against a parolee or probationer who refused to make his monthly COS payment. While IDOC
policies and procedures, such as the ones imposing the subject fees, establish an IDOC-required
course of action to follow, they do not have the force and effect of law and no cause of action can
he based on the same. \Vith respect to the fees at issue in this case, non-payment is not a concern as
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such fees are deducted from an inmate's account once the inmate utilizes the subject services.
Finally, Idaho Code §20-225 created a dedicated probation and parole receipts revenue fund for
moneys collected as costs of supervision. The fees at issue in this case, on the other hand, are
deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund.
The legislative history of Idaho Code §20-225 helps further explain why the cost of
supervision fee is set forth in statute despite the Board's implied authority to charge user fees. The
Statement of Purpose relating to the 1984 amendment to Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code adding
Idaho Code §20-225 (S.B. 1224) to provide that a person under probation or parole supervision shall
be required to contribute money for his supervision states:
The purpose of this legislation is to help offset some of the cost to the taxpayer of
supervising adult felons and to help develop responsibility on the part of the offender.
Current caseload sizes make it impossible to supervise felons as we feel they should
be and the community expects.
The minutes of the Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee relating to the amendment are
particularly enlightening:
SB1224

RELATING TO THE PAYMENT FOR PROBATION OR PAROLE
SERVICES
Al Murphy from the Department of Corrections spoke on the
proposed legislation. The bill would amend Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho
Code by the addition ofa new section 20-225 to provide that a person
under probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute
money for his supervision, i{not to provide for consequences. to also
provide exemptions for contributing money. The bill, ifpassed, would
create the probation and parole receipts account in a Dedicated
Fund.
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Director Murphy explained that the parolee, under supervision, would
be required to contribute a set amount per month. In collecting these
fees, a major purpose would be to hire new probation and parole
officers to start a program of supervision of the paroled 24 hours a
day, thus allowing the Department to provide an alternative to
incarceration for many inmates.
Representative McDermott quested the need for a dedicated fund;
was it to avoid going before the JF AC.
Representative Murphy responded by stating partially, because the
Department does not want to start collecting fees, then having their
appropriations cut by the amount of fees they collect. Mr. Murphy
went on to explain that the Department would like to get funded at the
same amount as present, but to let the Department keep the fees to
increase the services.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee, March 13, 1984
(emphasis added).
This context confirms that Idaho Code §20-225 is not simply authorization for the IDOC to
impose a fee but was intended to provide consequences for non-payment of the cost of supervision,
provide exemptions for contributing money and establish a dedicated fund to deposit the moneys
collected in order to allow the IDOC to implement an intensive supervision program. Thus, under
these circumstances, the presence of specific statutof'J authority relating to payment for probation
or parole services does not indicate that the IDOC lacks authority to charge user fees in relation to
services rendered to inmates housed at IDOC facilities.
Thus, reading all of the constitutional and statutory provisions together and recognizing that
the supervision and maintenance of prisons in the State ofidaho is a function of the executive branch
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of the government, specifically the Board of Correction, it is clear that the IDOC policies and
procedures at issue do not violate the separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches of the state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1, and the
District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs claims in this regard.

4.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Legislature Contemplated
That Penal Institutions May Sell Goods and Services and Expend the Funds
Arising From the Sale of the Same for the Maintenance, Use and Support of the
Institution.

As set forth above, in light of the clear grant of authority to the BOC to control and manage
Idaho's correctional facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its
custody, it cannot be said that Defendants infringed upon the province of the Legislature in
developing procedures related to the provision of institutional programs, activities and services to
inmates, i.e. telephone services, commissary services, medical services and photocopy services. The
power to impose the fees at issue, including the medical co-pay fee, the photocopying fee, the
telephone commissions and the commissary commissions, can be reasonably implied from a
consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole, Chapter

Title 20, Idaho Code, because the fees

relate to the operations of the IDOC and the administration of programs within the JDOC.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's reliance and arguments relating to the applicability ofldaho Code §67-3611
and alleged burdens thereunder are misplaced and inapposite; quite simply, the authority for the
charging of telephone and commissary commissions is not limited to Idaho Code §67-3611.
That provision does affirm that the Legislature contemplated that state institutions, including
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penal institutions, may sell goods and services and expend the funds arising from the sale of the
same for the maintenance, use and support of said institution. Idaho Code §67-3611 is entitled
"Expenditure of funds from sale of services, rentals or sale of products by state institutions," and
states:
All state institutions, educational, charitable, penal and otherwise, shall be allowed
to expend the funds arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property,
stock, farm or garden produce, or other goods, or article produced within or by the
institution, for the maintenance, use and support of said institution, without reducing
the amount of the appropriations made to such institutions; all such sums received
shall be deposited with the state treasurer and it is hereby made the duty of the state
controller and the state treasurer to enter deposits so received in the general fund of
the state, and the state controller shall add the deposits so received to the
appropriations made to such institutions severally; and the sums of money so
received are hereby appropriated from the general fund of the state ofldaho for the
maintenance, use and support of the institution by which the same are so received;
and the said moneys shall be expended for the use and support of such institution for
which the same were deposited, and shall be audited and accounted for as other
appropriations to the said institution are.
Based on the language of the statute, the District Court found that the commissions charged to
inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time and commissary goods are funds arising from
the sale of goods or services pursuant to Idaho Code §67-3611. (R, p. 00515, LL. 16-19.) Plaintiff~
however, argues, inter alia, that the statute does not apply because these items were not "produced
within or by the institution." Plaintiffs reliance on this phrase is misplaced. The pertinent section
states: "All state institutions, educational, charitable, penal and otherwise, shall be allowed to expend
the funds arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property, stock, farm or garden
produce, or other goods, or article produced within or by the institution, for the maintenance, use
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and support of said institution ... " LC. §67-3611 (emphasis added). Based on the plain language,
and considering the placement of comas, the District Court found that the phrase "produced within
or by the institution" only modified the word "article," not every item on the list as argued by
Plaintiff (R, p. 000731, LL 2-19.) Accordingly, the District Court con-ectly found that goods or
services do not have to be "produced within or by the institution" in order for Idaho Code §67-3611
to apply (R, p. 000731, LL. 17-19), and that telephone and commissary commissions are authorized
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-3611. (R, pp. 000515-516, LL. 24, 1-2.)
Plaintiff is essentially challenging the appropriation of funds by Idaho's Legislature. It is
undisputed that any commissions charged to inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time
and commissary goods are ultimately appropriated back to the IDOC for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316318; R, p. 000566-567.) Appropriation acts establishing annual agency operating budgets are law,
and the limits of those budgets cannot be exceeded. (R, p. 000566 at 16.) See also Idaho Code §673516 (1) ("Appropriation acts when passed by the legislature of the state ofldaho, and spending
authority made thereunder, whether the appropriation is fixed or continuing, are fixed budgets
beyond which state officers, departments, bureaus and institutions may not expend."). "A legislative
act is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be
resolved in favor of its validity." Rich, 81 Idaho at 316-17, 341 P.2d at 435. Plaintiffhas not made
a showing that the appropriation acts establishing the IDOC's annual operating budgets are
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unconstitutional and in absence of a clear showing of invalidity the Court must uphold the
constitutionality of the same. See
That the commissions charged to inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time and
commissary goods are deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, as opposed to the General
Fund, in no way indicates that these commissions are not legislatively authorized. To the contrary,
the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund makes up part of the annual budget appropriated by the Legislature
for the operation of the state correctional system. (R, p. 000316 at ,Il 4; R, p. 000566 at ,I8.) Thus,
the funds collected from the telephone and commissary commissions, deposited in the state treasury
and appropriated back to IDOC, are legislatively authorized through the appropriations process and
cannot be said to run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. Plaintiffs focus on technicalities
over substance is even more unavailing when one considers that Idaho Code §67-3611 was adopted
in 1945 and that there have been no substantive amendments to the statute since that time. 6 One
could assume that there have been changes to state budgetary and accounting processes and
procedures since 1945 that may not be reflected in every provision of Idaho Code. Moreover, the
District Court correctiy found that Idaho Code §67-3611 explicitly provides that it is the duty of the
state controller and the state treasurer, not Defendants, to enter deposits so received in the general
fund of the state. (R, pp. 000731-732, LL. 24, 1-2.) Plaintiff did not set forth any authority that stands

6The statute was amended in

1994 to reflect proper nomenclature, changing the name of state auditor
to state controller. See S.L. 1994, ch. 180, §215.
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for the proposition that any alleged failure of the state controller and state treasurer to enter the
deposits in the General Fund prohibits the Defendants from collecting such funds. (R, p. 000732, LL.
7-11.)
What matters for purposes of the instant analysis is that Idaho Code §67-361 I plainly
contemplates that state institutions, including penal institutions, may sell goods and services and
expend the funds arising from the sale of the same for the maintenance, use and support of said
institution. Again, there is no dispute that the telephone and commissary commissions challenged
by Plaintiff are deposited in the state treasury before they are appropriated back to the IDOC each
year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature.
Plaintiffs argument relating to Idaho Code §67-3602 is equally unpersuasive as that statute
in no way indicates that telephone and commissar/ commissions are legislatively unauthorized.
Idaho Code §67-3602 provides:
No portion of any appropriation made for expenses other than salaries and wages
shall be expended in payment of salaiies and wages; but with the consent of the state
board of examiners, any portion of any appropriation made for the payment of
salaries and wages may be expended for other expenses of the particular office or
institution for which it is appropriated.
Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence that the IDOC is expending the funds appropriated to it in a
manner inconsistent with that contemplated by the Legislature. Moreover, the District Court
correctly found that the subject matter of Plaintiffs Civil Complaint is what he alleges to be the
illegal raising of revenue, and not the manner in which allegedly illegally raised revenue is spent.
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(R, p. 000732, LL 14-16.) Nor for that matter has Plaintiff established that he would have standing
to make such a claim. Plaintiff did not set forth any authority that stands for the proposition that an
allegedly improper expenditure of revenue once raised prohibits Defendants from raising such
revenue in the future. (R, p. 000732, LL 16-19.) Ultimately, this case involves Plaintiffs claims
regarding the raising of revenue and there are no claims alleged in the instant case involving the
manner in which revenue is spent once raised. In light of the same, Plaintiffs reliance on Idaho Code
§67-3602 is misplaced.

D.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL.
Defendants respectfully request the Court award attorney fees and costs incurred for this

appeal. This request is based on Idaho Appellate Rules 3 5(b )( 5), 40, and 41 and Idaho Code § § 12121 and 3 l-3220A(l6).
1.

Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Costs on Appeal.

Idaho Appellate Rule 40 states that costs ''shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." Defendants are unaware
of any other provision oflaw that would forbid their recovery of costs should they prevail on appeal.
Therefore, Defendants respectfully request this Court award their costs as the prevailing party.

2.

Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Attornev Fees on Appeal.

An award of attorney fees may be granted under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate
Rule 41 to the prevailing party, and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 39

abiding belief that the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Rendon
v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Likewise,
Idaho Code §31-3220A(16)(b) provides a basis for an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal
in actions brought by plisoners if the comi finds that the action or any part of the action is frivolous
or malicious.
It is well established that the State Board of Correction is charged with the control, direction,

and management of the state penitentiary, and the care and maintenance of all prisoners. This entire
case stems from Plaintiffs voluntary decisions on how to spend his money as a prisoner in the
custody of the IDOC. Plaintiff has made his own decisions to purchase commissary items, to make
telephone calls, to photocopy documents, and to obtain medical services. In exchange for his money,
Plaintiff has received goods and the value of services rendered. Requiring Plaintiff to make
economic decisions about how to spend his money merely places him in a position similar to that
faced by those whose basic costs of living are not paid by the state. Thus, Plaintiff's claims are
frivolous and/or unreasonable, and Defendants have been forced to defend this appeal and incur
attorney fees. On these grounds, Defendants request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION
The District Court was correct in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the Decisions and Judgment of
the District Court should be affirmed.
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VII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _• day of June, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered
by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Barry Searcy 27413
ISCI Unit 13
P.O.Box14
Boise, ID 83707
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

